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NON-MARKET STRATEGY AND THE 
'RACE TO THE BOTTOM': LESSONS FROM 
THE BA YWATCH EXPERIENCE 
Marc T. Jones 
This article examines how international finns operate strategically in the 
non-market environment to secure advantages which improve their cost 
and/or revenue structures and, hence, their economic perfonnance. It 
centres on a detailed case study of the globally popular Baywatch 
television show's efforts during 1999 to secure attractive locational 
subsidies by placing the states of New South Wales, Queensland (both in 
Australia) and Hawaii into competition with each other in a 'race to the 
bottom'. The article is organized into three main sections: the first briefly 
reviews the concept of non-market strategy; the second examines the 
Baywatch case in detail; and the conclusion presents some lessons for 
various stakeholders involved in this and similar non-market contexts. 
Strategy in the Non-market Environment 
In charting the emergence of non-market strategy, an observer could go 
back to the strategies and tactics employed by such organizations as the 
British East India Company throughout its several centuries of operation 
on the subcontinent. The rise of non-market strategy as a fornmlized 
body of knowledge relevant to theory and practice is, however, much 
more recent. Baron {I 995) is credited with bringing the term 'non-market 
strategy' into the field of strategic management, while the journal 
Business and Politics (dedicated to the study of non-market strategy) 
only commenced in 1999. More recently, Ghemawat (2007) has 
integrated non-market insights into his research on global strategy. 
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According to Baron (2005:3), the business environment consists of both 
market and non-market components. The market component includes the 
interactions of buying and selling between firms and other parties and 
private agreements such as contracts. This is the domain of competitive 
strategy, where firms strive to win customers and market share through 
differentiated product offerings based on their respective sources of 
competitive advantage (el Porter, 1985). 
The non-market environment includes social, political and legal 
arrangements that structure interactions outside of - but in conjunction 
with - markets and private agreements. It encompasses those interactions 
between firms and individuals, interest groups, government entities, and 
the public that are intermediated by public institutions rather than 
markets or private agreements. The distinguishing characteristics of 
public institutions (ostensibly) include majority rule, due process, broad 
enfranchisement, collective action and transparency. Vitally, a firm can 
secure advantages in the non-market environment which serve to protect 
or enhance its position in the market environment. Non-market strategy 
thus offers another route to competitive advantage and superior economic 
performance. In some instances, non-market approaches can be more 
important than competitive strategy in generating firm-level advantages-
e.g., where effective lobbying garners an exclusive import/distribution 
license from a government agency. 
Non-market strategy is particularly important in relation to transnational 
corporations (TNCs). The impacts of corporate globalisation on host 
cOllntries - particularly of the developing or underdeveloped variety -
are matters of contentious debate. Mainstream TNC scholars in the 
'internalization' school (Buckley and Casson, 1985) or the 'transaction 
costs' school (Hennart, 1982) view this institution's existence as 
evidence of market failures, which its actions serve to ameliorate through 
the efficient allocation of organizational resources to their optimal value-
creating applications. TNC activities in the non-market environment are 
beyond the theoretical scope of scholars based in these paradigms. Other, 
broader approaches to these issue are taken by development economists 
sllch as Bhagwati (2002) and Sen (2001), both of whom agree (with. 
qualifications) that, on balance, globalization and TNCs are beneficial to 
the peoples of the developing world. 
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This article takes a more critical perspective, arguing through the means 
of a specific case, examined in detail, that globalization has had a major 
impact on the non-market environment with respect to the degree that it 
empowers TNCs relative to other stakeholders. Because TNCs by 
definition operate in numerous host countries, their subsidiaries have the 
opportunity to engage in multiple non-market strategies. They can thus 
enhance their structural bargaining power versus workers and states, 
thereby reducing claims by these stakeholders on their income streams. 
This increase in bargaining power is achieved most simply by placing 
mUltiple groups of workers located in different nations in competition 
with each other for the jobs which the TNC provides, and similarly by 
putting states in competition with each other for the jobs, capital, 
technology and tax revenue with which TNC investment is associated. 
Importantly, the transaction costs of pursuing such leveraging (or 'divide 
and conquer') strategies in the non-market environment have dropped 
substantially since the 1970s in reaction to the increasing pace of 
globalization and the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism (see 
Aglietta, 2000). This is because states have more explicitly entered into 
competition with one another to attract TNC investment, based on 
endogenous country-specific advantages combined (sometimes) with 
incentive packages. Meanwhile, TNCs have become increasingly adept 
at 'working the system' of interstate investment competition to optimise 
locational advantage throughout their value-chains (Jones, 2000). 
Multiple non-market strategies are not always integrated effectively at 
the headquarters level, however. In Australia, for example, the local 
subsidiary of Ford Motor Company (based in Melbourne since the 
1920s) works aggressively both by itself and at the industry level to 
lobby for continuation of the federal tariff on imported automobiles. 
Meanwhile, at the global level, Ford supports WTO efforts to reduce 
international tariffs on motor vehicle (and parts) imp0l1s and exports. 
The potential certainly exists, though, for TNCs to integrate their non-
market strategy at the corporate level in order to amplify their 
effectiveness, as well as to ensure that non-market efforts are linked and 
supportive of the firm's competitive strategy. 
Following Baron (2005), we ean regard the non-market environment of a 
finn or industlY as constituted by issues, interests, institutions and 
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information. Issues are the basic unit of analysis and the focus of non-
market action. Interests refer to the relevant stakeholders' desired 
outcomes with respect to the given situation. Institutions typically 
include govemment entities such as legislatures and regulator bodies, as 
well as business firms, unions and non-governmental organizations. 
Information refers to what the relevant stakeholders know, when they 
know it, how they perceive cause and effect relations, and what they 
think about the interests and capabilities of other stakeholders. 
These principles are evident in the non-market bargaining that were 
initiated and managed by the Baywatch producers, pitting Avalon beach 
(and the NSW government), the Gold Coast (and the Queensland 
government), and the state of Hawaii against each other to maximize 
locational advantage for the production company. 
Baywatch's Global Product 
In the 1990s the television program Baywatch was viewed by one billion 
people each week (Hornery and Schulze, 1998). This made it the most 
watched television program in the world, as boasted by producers (de 
Moreas, 2001). It was also the number one syndicated television show 
for many years (Petrozzello, 2001). The show was screened in 147 
countries and in 32 languages (Niesche, 1999). The show's original 
location was along Santa Monica Bay's 46km coastline in southern 
California. The show spent nine years there, starting in 1989 (with NBC), 
producing over 200 episodes (de Moreas, 2001). The production cost of 
each Baywatch episode was US$I.2m. This is slightly less than a 
network drama, but high for a syndicate (CP, 2001). The production 
company, as of 1998, was UK-based Pearson Television (Lalor, 1999). 
1998/1999: Baywatch leaves California 
Baywatch left California due to budgetary challenges and declining 
(domestic and international) ratings (Tighe, 1999). The objectives of 
relocating Baywatch included re-energizing the show, saving money and 
improving ratings (Ryan, 1999a). A focus report commissioned by the 
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show's producers stressed the need for change - especially to entice 
viewers back (Dent, 1998). The decline in domestic viewers was a major 
concern for producers. Their funding sources were located in the US: 
negative ratings in this home market would raise questions amongst the 
funding sources as to whether to continue the show. A new location 
outside the USA was seen to be the solution. International ratings were of 
secondary concern: if they also increased, that would be an added plus 
(Huff, 1999d). 
Initially, the Baywatch producers searched for locations within the 
Americas, such as Florida and Mexico. Due mostly to a lack of 'proper' 
surf beaches, however, they subsequently decided to look beyond the 
region. This included Southern Europe and Australia. The latter, Sydney 
specifically, was the real contender due to (I) surf beaches/culture and 
(2) the upcoming 2000 Olympic Games. The NSW state government was 
also the first to consider incentives to attract the show (Pollack, 1999). 
Hollywood's response to Baywatch leaving was predictable. Those 
involved in the film and television industry (especially who lost jobs as a 
result of the Baywatch decision) were unhappy. This equated to only a 
handful of people, however. Most recognized that losing Baywatch was 
not of major economic significance. For example, Los Angeles' film 
industry, alone, was still worth US$27 billion, annually. The reason for 
job losses was, by many, attributed to the reduced spending of all studios 
(Pollack, 1999). Furthennore, rather than the cause of frustration being 
Baywalch relocating, specifically, it was more the fact that it was another 
film/show to be leaving the State and country for cheaper horizons (Bates 
and Dixon, 1999). Still, the State of California acknowledged that it 
could not feasibly provide concessions to the local film industry, due to 
the costs involved. Also, general cost-cutting by the industry itself was a 
difficult and time consuming process - generating union involvement, 
and at times, resistance (FT, 1998). 
Further compounding the loss of film and television production 
domestically - in California and the USA - was the aggressive 
competition by other countries keen to secure such deals. Such countries 
include Canada and Australia. As noted in a 2005 Production report by 
the Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research (CEIDR), the 
trend of runaway productions is frequently linked to American films and 
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television being lured away from U.S. locations to out-of-country 
locations. A significant factor in these migrations is foreign subsidies 
offered to American companies, ultimately reducing the cost of making 
the film. According to the CEIDR report, 'The analysis reveals that, 
while there are certainly general economic factors at play, such as 
relative labor and exchange rates, the data over the past several years 
strongly suggests that proliferation of production subsidies around the 
globe has been one of the most significant factors affecting the choice of 
production venues for a significant volume of production' (CEIDR, 2006: 
I; see also United States Department of Commerce, 2001). 
[n Australia, for example, 'Ausfilm' (a department within 'Austrade'), 
seeks film and television opportunities for the country. Ausfilm is a 
consortium of all Australian State and Territory film commissions and 21 
private companies. Each StatelTerritory then competes for applicable 
deals. NSW, for instance, offers payroll tax concessions, while 
Queensland and SA offer other tax incentives. Such concessions/ 
incentives quickly add up to hundred-thousand dollar savings per 
film/television show. Other benefits of producing in the Australian 
context include: (I) (relatively) low value of A$ (exchange rates); (2) 
budgetary savings (the main benefit) of up to 30% through cheaper 
equipment hire; and (3) skilled and efficient crews (Jameson, 1999). 
Having had strong interests in coming to Australia (Sydney, specifically), 
Baywatch shot two episodes in the region. These focused primarily on 
the Sydney beachside suburb of Avalon. The episodes served two 
purposes: (1) to test the various locations for suitability; and (2) to 
measure viewer (US) response to such a move (Safe, 1998). 
1999: Baywatch Sydney? 
Sydney was the first choice for Baywatch producers. This followed the 
success (both financially and in ratings) of the two episodes shot in 
A valon and surrounding areas the previous year (Gelastopoulos, 1999). 
Having settled on the new location, Bonnan representing Baywatch met 
with Federal Tourism Minister, Jackie Kelly, in early 1999, and initially 
requested that State and/or Federal governments pay A$200,OOO in 
---------------------------------------- -------- -- --- --- --
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relocation costs for the show to move to Avalon (SCMP, 1999b). This 
request was increased to A$2 mil.lion shortly after to cover additional 
unforeseen costs associated with the move (Lalor, 1999). 
Bonnan was sure to spell out the benefits in Baywatch coming to 
Australia (Maynard, 1999). First, approximately A$20 million would be 
spent producing the show through April and October each year (I to 2 
days shooting per week for 22 weeks, annually) (Jamal, 1999). Two 
years production was guaranteed, with six very likely (Huff, 1999d). 
Second, the vast Baywatch audience meant tourism spin-offs for 
Australia, NSW and Sydney. Third, the show would create 220 jobs for 
locals. Fourth, as per 'Bonnan-math', every A$1 spent producing the 
show would generate A$21 spending for Avalon (Urban, 1999). 
The request was swiftly supported in theOl)' by the Federal government. 
Kelly found that there existed great potential to promote Australia 
internationally through Baywatch (Peschardt, 1999). More broadly, she 
(and the Federal government) perceived the advantages for Sydney and 
A ustralia as being: (1) the direct economic impacts of production; (2) the 
national image projected internationally for tourists; and (3) the ability 
for the area/state/nation to manage the exact image projected (Southgate, 
1999). In practice, however, the Federal government strongly 
encouraged the State government ofNSW to grant the incentive: in other 
words, the Federal government placed the financial burden on NSW. 
NSW Premier Carr refused, although he too supported it intheOl), (Lalor, 
1999). Despite this, Baywatch producers remained focused on Avalon. 
As part of the agreement with Pittwater Council - the municipality 
responsible for Avalon - Bonnan offered A$775 for each day's filming 
on Avalon beach. Pittwater Council was happy to take the show. This 
was based not on the above payment but on the indirect economic 
benefits the show would bring to the area-i.e. tourism spin-offs. In 
return, however, it was (strongly) implied that Baywatch would have 
priority use of, and access to, the beach and surrounding area, and its 
facilities. As a result, local schools would be unable to conduct surfing 
lessons whilst filming was taking place. Added to this, problems arose 
because Avalon beach is only 700m long - much shorter than the beach 
at Santa Monica, for instance (Macken, 1999b). Privileged access 
became the main sticking point between the show and its supporters 
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(including various levels of government) and (some) local Avalon 
residents. 
Residents of Avalon, upon hearing the impending intentions of the 
Baywatch producers, expressed their dissatisfaction with the planned 
move. They claimed that the show was exploiting the area to cut costs 
and to entice viewers back with a new location (Watts, 1999). This 
discontent grew over the following weeks. Bonnan and the Council 
feared that the community outcry would worsen, so attempted to keep the 
Avalon filming application submission as quiet as possible. Bonnan 
clandestinely, but with full Council knowledge, submitted the Avalon 
filming application to Pittwater Council by email at I minute to midnight 
on February 9 (Lalor, 1999); a decision was expected to take four weeks. 
News of the application submission nevertheless spread quickly amongst 
locals. Some Avalon residents then fonned the 'Anti-Baywatch Action 
Group' (ABAG) (Saluzsinszky, 1999). This group launched a 
community petition to gamer support against the Baywatch relocation. 
They quickly collected over 900 signatures - a significant number, 
considering Avalon's (permanent) population of just 9200 (Macken, 
I 999a). As the ABAG gained momentum, additional reasons for their not 
wanting the show arose. They argued that in late 1998, upon filming the 
two 'down under' episodes, the entire Baywatch cast and crew were rude, 
offensive and heavy-handed (Saluzsinszky, 1999). They went further, 
noting that the small size of Avalon beach could not, without detrimental 
environmental affects, accommodate such a large show. The show had 
destroyed Santa Monica beaches, and Avalon residents weren't going to 
let happen to their beach also (Macken, 1999b). Those in favor of 
Baywatch's move - Pittwater Council, Avalon surf club, local businesses 
and the State government - felt these claims were false and merely weak 
excuses (Saluzsinszky, 1999). 
Some observers asserted that Avalon residents were not Anti-Baywatch, 
but rather Anti-American. This was based on the fact that many 
Australian shows and/or commercials, had been, or were, filmed in the 
area: the popular television soap Home and Away for one. In these 
instances, residents had made no fuss (Macken, 1999b). Either way, 
Bonnan explicitly targeted the supporters so as to gain leverage in the 
community's decision making process, and ultimately, to mitigate locals' 
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concems about the relocation. His comments, referring to Avalon 
residents (protestors, specifically) as 'non-Australians' and snobs, 
however, did not help ease the situation (Macken, I 999a). It soon 
became clear that the show would have an uphill battle. Bonnan 
responded by (1) hiring corporate lobby group Gavin Anderson & 
Kortlang to aggressively push the show's interests at the local and State 
levels (Lalor, 1999), and (2) acknowledging that the resistance might be 
too difficult to overcome. The Baywatch executives then began searching 
for other areas in the region and nation. Queensland's Gold Coast and 
Coffs Harbor in NSW were quick to put up their hands (Roberts, 1999). 
NSW Premier Carr and several of the State's tourism chiefs expressed 
disappointment at local residents' opposition to Baywatch (Maynard, 
1999). They saw only ( economic) positives for Avalon, Sydney and 
NSW - above all, the potential to promote tourism development. 
Interestingly, however, it was also Premier Carr who was not willing to 
give the show the A$2m incentives/concessions they had requested 
(Lalor, 1999) - the in practice component. At the local level, Pittwater 
Council Mayor, Patricia Giles, was angry at what she described as a few 
stubbom people ruining 'it' (the expected rise in local real-estate 
values?) for everyone. This anger was felt in the private sector also. That 
is, many enterprises in Avalon were keen for the show to relocate to 
boost business and trade. Yet, they felt intimidated by the local 'mob' 
opposing Baywatch, and were not willing to express their views for fear 
of retribution (Morris, 1999). 
Following an incendiary general public meeting, the level of opposition 
to Baywatch was made clear to Bonnan (Maynard, 1999). The Council 
decision, whether for or against, was starting to seem irrelevant. Bonnan 
asserted that, if Avalon did not want the show, then he would not push 
the matter any further (Murphy and Doherty, 1999). The Baywatch 
executives stated that many other Australian towns were welcoming the 
show with open arms. Cities and towns in other nations followed suit, 
including locations in Hawaii (Gelastopoulos, 1999). This was the first 
mention of the so-called 'surf state' as a possible location. Jt was not to 
be the last. 
On Thursday, February, 25, the Baywatch producers began scouting 
other areas in NSW. These included Wollongong, Cronulla, Maroubra, 
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Coogee, and Newcastle (Niesche, 1999). While physically attractive 
places, they were not financially viable options. The local councils were 
happy for, even encouraged, the show to relocate to their municipalities, 
but they did not have incentives/concessions to entice. That same day, 
the producers new to Queensland. The Gold Coast, after all, had the 
beaches. It also eagerly supported Baywatch both in theory, and more 
importantly (for the producers) in practice (with incentives/concessions) 
(Razer, 1999). The end result of Avalon's rejection of Baywatch was thus 
the simultaneous offers stemming from Queensland and Hawaii. These 
areas/regions then became the real contenders for the show's relocation. 
1999: Baywatch Gold Coast? 
The Baywatch executives new to Queensland's Gold Coast prior to the 
Avalon general public meeting. This was on Tuesday, February 23. 
While there, Bonnan met with Queensland Tourism minister Gibbs and 
Gold Coast Mayor Baildon, who represented the Beattie government's 
interests. The trip north was not revealed by Baywatch executives to any 
of the parties involved in the NSW bid. Bonnan (and Baywatch, 
generally) felt that the Avalon public meeting the following day would 
not resolve the issues raised by locals (Roberts, 1999). As a result, and 
after being explicitly made aware of a Queensland offer, he wished to 
discuss the possibility of relocating to the Gold Coast instead -
specifically, Currumbin beach (Balogh, 1999). The Beattie government 
was very keen to secure a deal with Baywatch. It quickly made this 
known to the producers. The Beattie government felt that the benefits 
(production spending; jobs; tourism promotion, etc.) the show would 
bring to the State, and locally, were significant (Roberts, 1999). As a 
result, Queensland/Gold Coast were willing to provide a substantial 
incentive package to entice the show north (Fischer, 1999). 
Following the Avalon meeting the producers returned to Queensland. By 
Friday, February 26, Bonnan clinched an in-principle agreement with 
Gibbs to relocate the show to the Gold Coast (Lalor, 1999). The 
agreement was to be formally signed one week later (Murphy and Jamal, 
1999). For Queensland Tourism minister Gibbs, the in-principle 
agreement meant the deal was as good as done (Niesche, 1999). It also 
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meant that Baywatch would start shooting on Currumbin beach by June, 
1999 (Morris, 1999). Curiously, Bonnan and his associates were 
unavailable for comment after word spread of the in-principle agreement 
(SCMP, 1999c). 
The incentive/concession package offered to Baywatch by the 
Queensland govemment was similar to that rejected by NSW Premier 
Carr, a fact which was initially kept hidden because it was 'commercial 
in confidence'. Yet details were nonetheless rapidly disseminated 
through informal channels, since the deal was supposedly 'as good as 
done' (Niesche, 1999). Queensland's offer, however, was more generous. 
The total value of the package was approximately A$3 million (Grattan 
and Martin, 1999): this included tax concessions (a payroll tax rebate of 
5%, and a cast and crew rebate equal to 10% of each wage paid to a local 
worker); free fire and police services; free location research; free 
accommodation; and other free services (in retum for exposure on the 
show) (BBCON, 1999). Bonnan, in retum (and to gamer local support), 
offered Currumbin Surf Life Saving Club a (one-off) payment of 
A$40,000 for the use of its premises (Robbins and Balogh, 1999). 
The next day, Saturday, February 27, the Baywatch executives left 
Queensland bound for Hawaii (Murphy and Jamal, 1999). Prior to 
leaving, Bonnan personally called Gibbs to infonn him of the trip and to 
tell him that he looked forward to signing the contract upon retuming; 
that is, he assured Queensland that it was (remained) the real contender 
(Austin, 1999). Enter the challenger: Hawaii (Murphy and Doherty, 
1999). 
1999: Baywatch Hawaii! 
Hawaii entered as a contender for Baywatch's relocation following the 
disputes surrounding Avalon. April Masini, an official from the 
Hawaiian Tourist Commission, called producers and invited them to 
scout particular Hawaiian beaches where they would be welcome (Huff, 
I 999c). The Hawaiian State was keen to secure the Baywatch relocation 
because of the previous success with 'Hawaii Five-a' and 'Magnum P.I.' 
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In promoting the region to domestic (US) and international tourists 
(Purdum, 1999). 
Upon meeting Hawaiian officials, Bonnan spelled out the potential 
benefits of the show to the regional/local economies and the fact that, if 
sllccessful, filming would begin in June, 1999 (Fischer, 1999). He also 
noted that Queensland was very aggressively pursuing the show so as to 
secure the deal - their package was attractive (Ryan, 1999a). Hawaii, not 
to be outdone by Queensland, put its own (slightly) larger 
incentive/concession package together. The State, county, local labor and 
visitor industry came together to design the package. This was 
subsequently approved by Hawaiian Governor Cayetano. The offer 
consisted of US$14.5 million in incentives/concessions in the first year, 
and another US$42 million over the six years that Baywatch was to air 
(Robbins, 1999b). Furthermore, some local labor unions were 
considering lowering wage/salary packages by up to 30%. This would 
reduce production costs to the estimates expected in Australia (Ryan, 
1999c). (It is important to note that at this stage, the package's exact 
contents were only known by Hawaiian and Baywatch officials.) In 
return for these incentives, Hawaii requested that the show's name be 
changed to 'Baywatch Hawaii.' Producers apparently had no problem 
with this request (Ryan, 1999d). 
For Baywatch, Hawaii was seen to offer additional benefits, relative to 
Queensland. These comprised (I) a very attractive, coordinated 
government and local union incentive package to attract the show; and 
(2) closer proximity/easier access to the US mainland for media 
appearances (Donnelly, 1999). In fact, the package was so 'attractive' 
that, although Hawaii was a US State and thus had similar wage 
structures to LA, the show would still be able to reduce costs 
significantly. Prior to Hawaiian officials approaching Baywatch with the 
deal, the show's producers had never considered the island State to be a 
viable production site, as they assumed costs could not be reduced 
significantly within the USA (Ryan, 1999c). 
Conversations between the Baywatch producers and Hawaiian officials 
continued for some time. The original planned signing date for the 
Queensland deal (March I) passed by. The media, having sensed a 
possible scandal, started to raise questions about the strength of the in-
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principle agreement for the Currumbin relocation. Nonetheless, 
Queensland officials remained as confident as ever. By March 8, Bonnan 
and his associates were still in Hawaii. Speculation continued to grow. 
It was also at this point that an unlikely individual entered the debate -
Australian Prime Minister John Howard. Upon hearing of the producers' 
extended time abroad, he expressed his anger at the Avalon residents for 
pushing the show away. If Australia lost Baywatch, and all its much 
lauded economic benefits, it would evidently be the fault of the Avalon 
protestors. Howard stressed that Australia could not afford to wave-off 
foreign investment and further job creation, just because of a few selfish 
individuals. The PM's comments filtered through to Bonnan in Hawaii, 
who welcomed and echoed them (Grattan and Martin, 1999). 
On March 10, the Baywatch producers, still in Hawaii, finally 
corroborated that the island US state was competing against Queensland 
for the show. Bonnan noted that, while the Queensland offer was very 
attractive, so too was the Hawaii offer. 11 was at this point that the details 
of the Hawaiian package emerged. The Beattie government immediately 
stated that it could not match Hawaii's package. It was infuriated that 
Baywatch had said nothing of the deal prior to that date. Queensland, or 
QEC, specifically, then demanded that Bonnan explain. Furthermore, the 
Queensland govemment requested that Bonnan provide full flight details 
of his return trip to Australia before any further negotiations whatsoever 
(Robbins, I 999b ). This was because Bonnan, by that stage, had already 
delayed his return twice. Bonnan complied, and announced that he would 
arrive in Brisbane the next day, on Thursday, March II (Robbins and 
Balogh, 1999). Some media reports suggested that, with the involvement 
of the Prime Minister, Bonnan believed the Beattie government would be 
pressured into offering more concessions and incentives to attract the 
show (Grattan and Martin, 1999). 
The expected arrival of Bonnan in Queensland was again delayed. 
Bonnan stated that he needed more time in Hawaii to consider the further 
concessions that had been offered to BaywaTch (Balogh, 1999). On 
March 11, the State of Hawaii decided to include in their upcoming 
budget a bill for US$I.7 million in infrastructural 'improvements' to 
attract the show (DJN, 1999). The money would be used for (J) 
refurbishments to the Haleiwa Recreation Centre and Haleiwa marina, 
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(2) costs associated with Baywatch's relocation (i.e. boat and water 
equipment transportation from the US mainland), and (3) renovations to 
the Hawaii Film Studio. The latter included the building of a huge water 
tank and a new lifeguard beach set for the show (Purdum, 1999). With 
the postponement of Bonnan's arrival, the Queensland government 
finally accepted that Baywatch was orchestrating a bidding war between 
Queensland and Hawaii. Still, Queensland remained confident that the 
in-principle deal remained (Robbins, 1999a). 
On Saturday, March 13, after several delays, Bonnan arrived in 
Queensland. His return, though, was strategic. During what was the final 
part of the negotiations with Hawaiian officials, one issue arose that had 
the potential, according to Bonnan, to stop the show's relocation to 
Haleiwa Alii beach. This was a dispute with the Teamsters union of 
Hawaii. Excepting the Teamsters, which represents drivers of various 
types, all other local unions involved in the show's production had 
agreed to Baywatch 's request of wage/salary reductions of approximately 
30% for the full six years the show was expected to air. The unions that 
agreed included the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IA TSE) (Ryan, 1999b). The 
catch, however - and what made the resolving of the Teamsters issue 
critical - was that the SAG and the IA TSE made these concessions 
conditional and contingent upon all unions involved in production 
agreeing similarly. Hence, without the Teamsters there were no 
concessions at all (Ryan and Yuen, 1999). 
Bonnan refused, very publicly, to return to Hawaii until the Teamsters 
agreed to the concessions. Hence, by returning to Queensland, he aimed 
to pressure the union to agree to Baywatch's terms. He repeatedly 
commented to the media that the Australian deal was also very attractive, 
and that labor costs would naturally be lower there also. According to 
Bonnan, then, the entire multi-million dollar deal hinged solely on the 
Teamsters issue (Ryan, 1999b). 
Despite the impending deadline for the final decision on March 13, the 
Teamsters refused to budge. Reed (Teamster leader) expressed his anger 
about the producers pressuring him to agree to the concessions. 
Furthermore, he felt that they were leveraging their support from the 
state government to force him to comply. Reed asserted that the 
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wage/salary cuts were the largest ever requested by any producers. The 
Teamsters usual concessions were normally no greater than a 15% 
salary/wage cut and no holiday pay. According to Reed: the discounts 
were ' ... lower than whale shit' (Lalor, 1999: 5). Cayetano slowly but 
surely became nervous about the disagreement and feared that the 
Teamsters really would jeopardize the entire deal. As a result, he asked 
one of his councilors to contact Reed to try to bring the dispute to end 
ASAP. Hannemann was a close relative of Reed's. It was hoped that, 
being family, Hannemann's advice would be heeded by Reed. Cayetano 
was also quick to make it known to Baywatch executives that Hawaii 
really did want to host the show, and that he would do everything 
possible to ensure a speedy resolution of the Teamsters issue (Ryan, 
199ge). 
Baywatch needed just one more day to reach a decision. On March 14, 
1999, it was officially announced that Baywatch would relocate to 
Hawaii (Saltau, 1999). However, this decision was made in light of the 
fact that the Teamsters still had not agreed to the concessions (SCMP, 
1999a). Hence, the producers found the Hawaiian package very 
attractive, even without the remaining concessions. They also assumed 
that they could still convince Reed to accept concessions in the future 
(BBCON, 1999). 
Following the announcement of Hawaii's success and Queensland's 
failure, the QEC and the Beattie government were furious. Gibbs, for 
instance, accused Bonnan of returning to Queensland only in an attempt 
to 'scare' Hawaii (Saltau, 1999). Queensland was used as a negotiating 
tool or, as another observer put it, Queensland was the '. . . fish 'n' 
bargaining chips' (Woodley, 1999: 1). The QEC, in the meantime, talked 
of deception and the prospect of taking legal action against Baywatch 
producers for reneging on the in-principle agreement (Lagan, 1999) - a 
threat which was never pursued. Amid the anger and mayhem, the 
members of the Queensland opposition party (Liberal) were smiling at 
the apparent incompetence of the Beattie-lead government. They noted 
that Gibbs had put all his cards on the table face-up, which meant that 
Hawaii had only to match or slightly better Queensland's offer -
although Hawaii went far beyond this (Fischer, 1999). 
NON-MARKET STRATEGY - THE BAYWATCH EXPERIENCE 47 
Shortly after announcing Hawaii's success, the Baywatch executives 
returned there to finalize the negotiations. On March 24, Bonnan met 
with Teamsters leader Reed in an attempt to resolve the wage/salary 
issues and to ensure the move to Hawaii. Reed refused and stood firm, 
citing the 30% concessions as excessive and unwarranted. The Baywatch 
producers reiterated that the cost cuts were necessary and that, without 
them, the show could not be made. They also pleaded with Cayetano to 
step in and help. The producers expressed that they very much wanted to 
remain within the USA, but because of the Teamsters they could not do 
so. Bonnan then threatened to return to Australia yet again! And this 
time, he asserted, there would be no comeback to Hawaii - ever (Huff, 
1999t). 
Three days passed and the situation in Hawaii had not eased. On 
Saturday, March 27, Bonnan announced that, to his deep regret, 
Baywatch was being forced to return to Australia - where in Australia, he 
did not say - because of the Teamsters' unwillingness to cooperate - or, 
more specifically, Reed's unwillingness to cooperate (Huff, 1999b). 
Bonnan vociferously declared ' ... it's all over', and called the Teamsters 
' ... knuckleheads . ... and ' ... un-American' (Ryan, 1999a: 2). (Recall 
that Avalon protestors were termed un-Australian.) He also duly noted 
that Reed was personally and solely responsible for Baywatch having to 
move again. Reed responded by stating that his first objective was to 
ensure that his union members were well looked after. He also mentioned 
that all 19 members supported his actions fully. Other Teamsters 
members exclaimed that (I) Baywatch was 'crying poor 'and that (2) 
Australia was not a true contender but, rather, a bargaining tool (Ryan, 
1999a). 
Having heard of the change of fortunes in Hawaii, Queensland officials 
publicly declared their willingness to reopen negotiations. They had not, 
however, been contacted by Baywatch producers (Atkins, 1999). This 
was odd since the show was almost certainly (at this point) leaving 
Hawaii! Tourism Minister Gibbs said that the A$3 million package was 
still on offer. There would be no additional concessions though. Gibbs 
acknowledged that, while the real chances of Baywatch returning were 
slim and despite the producers (dodgy) business dealings, the potential 
economic benefits to Queensland were worth a last ditch attempt 
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(Emerson and Balogh, 1999). Queensland's welcoming an11S was good 
fortune for Bonnan, since there was no guarantee that the show would 
ever be allowed back into Australia following the last controversial 
departure. It also conveniently placed even more pressure on Reed to 
comply. 
Baywatch's pressure tactics against Hawaii and the Teamsters paid off. 
On Wednesday, March 31, the Teamsters (Reed) finally agreed to some 
initial concessions. Bonnan was quick to say that it was 'a' step in the 
right direction. For Bonnan, however, it was only a start. Teetering on 
the verge of agreement, he 'offered' the Teamsters one final opportunity 
to fully comply - on April I, 1999 (the next day). OtheIWise, Baywatch 
was off to Australia. Note that, thus far, the show's producers had neither 
been in contact with, nor met any Australian officials involved in the 
Queensland bid (Ryan and Yuen, 1999). The supposed plan to retum to 
Australia was a simple, yet effective, means of placing pressure on the 
Hawaiians. 
D-Day was April I, 1999. Hawaii won the deal as Baywatch's new home 
(Adamski, 1999). The Teamsters again buckled under the pressure. Reed 
agreed to all concessions, but demanded that holiday pay, albeit reduced, 
should remain (CT, 1999). Bonnan and his associates found this to be 
reasonable. Reed's change of heart stemmed from (I) the Hawaiian 
State's involvement! determination to secure the deal (i.e. Cayetano), and 
(2) Hannemann, who kept him level-headed and brought him to see the 
producers' side also! (Ryan, 1999d). 
2000 and Beyond: the Denouement 
A little over a year later, on February 17,2000, Bonnan was again clying 
poor. He requested the Hawaiian State to provide an additional US$2.5m 
to cover unforeseen budget blow-outs and a 50% drop in intemational 
revenues. Without this, Bonnan stressed, the show would be finished 
(Zilbreman, 2000). Hawaii obliged and made some further concessions 
(undisclosed), but not all. Around this time also, David Hasselhoff, the 
show's star, left Baywatch. This was another blow to the show's ratings 
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(Markham-Smith, 2000). Finally, after the two guaranteed years of 
filming in Hawaii, Baywatch was cancelled in 2001. I 
Implications and Lessons 
This detailed case study illustrates how a firm that is internationally 
mobile can use non-market strategy to obtain maximum benefits with 
respect to its locational decisions. Baywatch placed the states of New 
South Wales, Queensland and Hawaii in direct competition with each 
other, using the resulting leverage to exploit the most generous package 
of locational incentives, thereby maximizing cost advantages and 
minimizing transaction costs for the show. 
As the case clearly illustrates, the bidders for Baywatch were operating in 
an environment lacking full information, including the sincerity of the 
producer's claims. The three states were thus placed in a 'race to the 
bottom' to outbid each other in order to 'win' what had become a 
competitive event in its own right. Somewhere along the way, 'winning' 
and the status of hosting the Baywatch series opportunity became the 
primary drivers of governmental decision makers, irrespective of the 
show's actual positive impact on the local economy (net of the subsidy 
package). In light of this and similar actions exhibited by various 
government agencies considered in this article, Baron's (2005) depiction 
of public institutions in terms of majority rule, due process, and 
transparency is revealed as being normatively rather than empirically 
based. 
The lessons of this case for the relevant stakeholders seem fairly clear. 
For governments (at any level), the imperative is to avoid getting caught 
up in a race where each party tries to outbid the other with taxpayer 
dollars. Of course, this is easier said then done, particularly when the 
international firm usually holds most of the cards (in terms of both 
information and options). Governments could try to better communicate 
with each other in order to reduce the informational advantage of the 
In September 2003, the race was back on to woo the reincarnated Baywatch, which 
had changed its name to Coral Coast TV. This time, however, the battle was 
between Fiji and the Gold Coast (AAP, 2003). 
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finn and put some agreed upon limit to the subsidies/concessions they 
would offer. It is certainly within governments' control to ensure that 
subsidy packages always make sense in tenns of their expected net 
economic impact, and that 'winning' does not become an end in itself. 
Lastly, the case also illustrates the difficulties governments can have 
imposing their will when local stakeholders are resourced and motivated 
(and, especially, coordinated) in opposition. 
For workers, the case illustrates the problem of being caught between 
other stakeholders and pressured from many directions at once to settle 
for below market wages and/or conditions in order to secure 'the deal'. 
The Teamsters in Hawaii held out for some time while all other involved 
unions buckled immediately at the prospect of Baywatch coming to the 
island State. But even the Teamsters ultimately withered before the 
prospect of employment for their members and extreme pressure from 
the Hawaiian government. Given the massive surplus of semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers as globalization unfolds, the ability of TNCs to 
minimize labor costs can be expected to increase over time. 
For local communities such as Avalon in NSW, lessons include the 
potential for grassroots democracy to be effective in opposition to 
decisions being imposed 'from above'. Local residents were probably 
more displeased with the bureaucratic, elitist and undemocratic process 
of attracting Baywatch than they were with the actual impact of the show 
on their community. It is also pertinent to note that Avalon is a very 
wealthy suburb, and its residents were singularly well positioned (in 
tenns of resources, education and motivation) to fight initiatives imposed 
from outside their locality. 
Finally, for firnls using leveraging strategies in the non-market 
environment, the obvious attraction of methods such as those employed 
by Baywatch must be balanced against longer-tenn concerns for a 
positive reputation, the capacity to attract good business partners, and to 
avoid pariah status among critical stakeholder groups. Baywatch 
certainly burned some bridges in this case. And yet, in the end, the 
production company was successful in extracting substantial subsidies 
from Hawaii. Certainly, in this case non-market strategy was the primm)' 
source of value creation for Baywatch, as there was no evidence that the 
show was competing with other movie or television production 
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companies for locational advantages in a manner commensurate to the 
'race' between the Gold Coast and Hawaii. The balance of bargaining 
power throughout the three-way negotiations always remained with 
Baywatch, as is typical when mobile capital interacts with more place-
bound stakeholders such as states and workers. 
Nonetheless, a relevant question is whether the actions attributed to 
Baywatch - essentially a transient entity - are typical of more 
'traditional' TNCs in the manufacturing or resource extraction sectors. 
Some observers (eg. Matten and Crane, 2005) argue that many TNCs are 
expanding their positive role as corporate citizens, particularly in 
developing and underdeveloped countries, by participating in the 
provision of critical 'public goods' to vulnerable groups. And yet there is 
continuing evidence of major global firms employing blatant 'divide and 
conquer' strategies to maximize locational advantages - Disney 
Corporation's practice of placing potential host cities in competition for 
new theme parks is a case in point. Furthermore, 'networked' TNCs such 
as Nike are famous for shifting their supply chains in response to 
changes in relative labor costs and operating conditions (Dicken, 2007), 
with scant regard to the closed factories and unemployed workers left in 
their wake. 
Thus we would suggest that the Baywatch example - while not 
constituting the 'rule' in interactions between TNCs, states and workers-
is not 'exceptional' in the contemporary global political economy. 
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